

Gibb 23 May

McG B

No more escalation } trying to put up a wall
Foster withholds } against piped time-table.

"McG still believes we have national security
interests in VN — so does McN"

middle of the road, still hilly as

McG

Barinon has switched, to piped time-table,
for Muskie. (not yet publicly for McGowan, but in)

Clipped for McGowan, though reservations about
June '71 cutoff. Will testify for Muskie.

McGowan can't get more than 40; 35 would
be defeat, embarrassment of Pres.

Chick-Cooper may pass House, if Fulbright
holds up Military Sales in Conference.

VNZ

Before Cambodia:

Defects of VNZ sum:

1. Waste of lives before VNZ seem to have failed (with NVA encouraged to press).
2. poss. that Nixon would escalate if NVA pressed. (ASR: prob = 0)

Now: 1. Likelihood NVA will press soon; in

VN or Cambodia, Laos, (no longer wanted of VNZ; seems to do so....)

2. Almost certain N. will escalate: big

(along with repression

"Const. crisis, eh?")

Not merely futile, but risky.

A FORM OF "GRADUALISM" — tempting

Cons to wait till we get to 100,000, the limit — instead of DECISIVE WITHDRAWAL.

Halperin

16 May 76

Nixon will escalate.

His strategy will lead to the Com pressures he has said will lead to "strong, decisive action" (by bombing of North). He will carry them out.

[His style means: one morning, we will wake to hear of massive raids — "he'll miss Haiphong before he's out of office" — vs. NVN. Maybe "before" they've stepped up attacks.]

[Cambodia may serve as "test" of US reaction — then if not intended as such, he may learn from it, be ready for expressive reaction — as well as "lesson" for public: what to expect. Cong. reaction critical, as after Tonkin Gulf: indecisive action will be "practical equivalent of a T.G. Res." Once again, his on nature, "provocation," "our troops/ships in danger"; this ^{time} _{after}.

Loose: CA & ins:

After 18 March, Sidant Corp, Nixon
offered DRV not to hit sanctuaries if they
didn't press Son Nol.

[Was this the warning that led them to
move from sanctuaries, west — triggering attack?] A
4
1

[Halperin: David said to have reacted by
amplifying operation vs. S'ville — which
would have justified "demon" label.] Z
C


[After or with escalation, what, next time?

"Marginal" of descent; concentration camps?

Now that Hanoi has again been encouraged
to think — by descent — that Nixon "cannot
escalate, again" (McG B to Halperin) —
he will "have" to demonstrate again that he can.]

VNZ — assured ^{survival} ~~success~~ of an anti-Comm regime:

by slow reduction to 100-250,000 level of US troops.

[risk of escalation] determine, demonstrations,  → mines?

Cooke: 7 May 70

Not just the opportunity of Sihanouk's absence;
Nixon felt he had to; military essential:

(a) VNZ not working; solid once again
on the ~~totally~~ chimeric of military decision
effort.

(Brit: VNZ spells "victory.")

(b) How would his most solid constituency
take it if the ~~late~~ Cambodia "fell" without
his doing anything. [insistent, ... replies...]

(Davis: military misread intent of
Comm; now, C agrees, they are more likely to do it).

(c) "What tipped the scales was the
Soviet pilots in
Egyptian MIGs."

Richardson not struggling against; ready to
see "how it turns out" (we can't prove
our case" — [note, burden of proof: so,
McN vs. Ball: what's your solution?
What proof do you have?")

Kissinger: "didn't say no."

[WASAG: Wash. Action Group: listed below
Special Group: Packard, Johnson, Wheeler, Kissinger].

But Rich "got the word" today when visited
by students.

Klein (or Cantel):

Congress were "expanding this sanctions",
moving out of them, ... after 20 April
speech. ("Rogers was not surprised"),

"Courageous decision" — no one can dispute that.

"When they realize

"Objectives Pres has are same as the students —
question is how you do it. Want to bring the troops
home as soon as possible, have peace...

Pres was probably surprised at the intensity

We may not have done a good job of
letting the students feel they have been heard.

'Hickel's letter is good illustration that Cabinet
off. doesn't have to agree...

"We didn't particularly want it to be out to the public —
I did not want it

In some Admin, if a leak occurred, Pres would get upset and change the decision —

This Pres will give the letter ~~the~~ careful attention, whether he reads it in letter or in the paper. —

(Amplis, "geop machine in H's department.")

(Cantl: Pres is you leaked it.)

HK: Purpose is to destroy the bases, supplies, not soldiers. "Soldiers they can replace, these bases are harder. They can, in 10-12 months; but, now time to train where, replace Americans.

HK: "We say we've had 4 raids — we don't hide it, like the other side. When we make a mistake, we admit it. ..."

"Pres has considered all alternatives, from getting out to [LIE]

We have a leader who is calm, rational...
not imperious...

[Nixon on White House: "They can't
understand why people are making so much
fuss; it's just...."]

[They ignore the picture ^{contrast with the} they put out
earlier; and the way this image was
contradicted. Just as in Tet, preceded by
Nov 67.

Nixon: "The Soviets will protest, as we did in Czech";
[What if they react to SALT and negotiate
Nixon/Kiss did over Czech?

Recommendation in writing to LBJ: "Wise Men."

Assuming VN leadership was there, as estimated (?);
then provide training + equipment
(rough 4")

Give the 2 years (March '68), quietly;
at end of that time, phased ^{total} withdrawal.

(Got to

Nixon sends to be doing this, as soon as
they got in. Still is what he says he's
doing, so what can you do....?

Recommended as Supreme Comdr. we get
out altogether ^{of Korea} (but they didn't; so wouldn't
do it now)

would not leave any troops in VN.

100,000 men would be subject to constant
harassment, rioting, etc. — public wouldn't
stand...

Crazy; madness.
(Didn't know about it till afterwards).

6 May

NVA

Sanis: Think they wanted to restore
the status quo — take the heat off
the borders.

We

Couldn't do this several years ago:


near income in both VN & US:

They:

"We're doing so well... we can now afford to
take chances like this. America has been quiet

"There is an opportunity... to set the back
some months, weaken them, etc.,...

The generals were wrong: believed the
Com were taking over Cambodia militarily;
Sanis doesn't; they don't have an
apparatus with which to control the country;
or, yet, even to run Phnom Penh (so they
probably won't take that



Nixon:

creativity of the US would be destroyed in
every area of the world

chased security of our American men

not be intimidated

defeated

killed from sanctuaries

Bargaining or Aggression

"By the end of June...

all troops will be out [of Cambodia]

They're of going in 21.7 km

of advisors, in support

SVNese...

- Are we "still in" ... or getting out ... or going in?
- What is VNZ?

Part history: France; Dien; 1962-64;

Why ~~put~~ ^{go} stay in? (despite pressure)

Com takeover

loss of Indochina

loss of SEA: Dominoes

Rain

Prestige, influence: Eisenhower

(Loss/Buy of Pigs → Cuba II)

Monolithic Com

↳

MCC

Cambodia: "Communist" SV, Hanoi (or, "be unenter")

Escalation models: Schles

SDS

Why?

BUYING TIME ... FROM COMS, WITH US TRU

... FROM US PUBLIC, WITH LIES...

Peace-in 1965 :

Tanki Half 64 = Cambodia '70

US also

↳ 1950's : ~~Korea~~ Can take on "anywhere, by
any means" strength of "Korean" :
Start us : whether we had trial or not.
So, Try (to prevent).

(and, McC)

↳ '60's : Begin that we had trial,
McC...

6
6
7

(#)

U



X X

L # 5 5 5 2

John Lewis 16 July 70

1948-50 in
China

-3
2 million

(1 1/2 million villages;
1-2 operated from
villages)

Almost no retaliatory operations
of Nationalists.

(Virtually none in cities)

"I think were in this is a fight to
the finish; war will drag on indefinitely.

NVN think they have advantages; no
interest in negot. Nor do we.

Question: 30 April (on Pms making troops
into Cambodia)
(self-determination)

Questions on Cambodia

{ Gills
Hoffman

N/E on dominoes

Question as witness

relate to Tonkin, West request: Abrams' desire,
VCS request?

1. What logic, definitions. (5-year-old sanctions,
threatening US troops = i.e. threatening "success"
of VN Z.)

2. VN Z has failed: Can have shown initiative,
upstart timetable, controlled events:

[3. Upstart power that "success" in VN would
preserve dominoes.]

4. ^G Surprised this is simply response to opportunity.
Plecker
[Like Tonkin Gulf; Wheeler request for 20,000]

V

Fangio: must win at the slowest possible speed. (safety)

Pipon clique is neo-imperialistic; colonialist; want to purchase large area of the world, influence, control, trade.

BELLEN

8 JULY 70

[See Daniel? McN; Rogers; Kissinger;

Tell them they don't know the enemy. Don't know their options, which will be;

(1) Enemy will respond neither to threat or blandishment;

(2) large part of public will be willing to go along with horrible things;

(3) it will be possible + necessary for them to do these things - they could not justify now, & will condemn them forever in history.

Species: "SU must now restrain Hanoi; if they take Saigon, we will have to use nukes; and SU wants peace with us."

Enemy has determination & capability to frustrate our schemes; and our declaratory policy etc....

The RAND Corporation

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Nixon prob. expects to be bombed
anyway; & war was over; met key def
Nixon: (Wants to humiliate
yellow opponent) He
will accept escalation
rather than "defeat";
indeed, he wants that — to win.
They can be forced to negot.

DRV miscalculated severely in 68-69;
they thought they had made it; that country
was tried out; but N pulled them together.
To conduct premature war
vs. China under excuse of
punishing them for opposing us
in SVN: is probably acceptable
to USAF.

Nixon believes other side will
give in; [& this will hold up...]
[, 75 (very wary about politics)]
KK: "Certain" that Nixon will bomb,
& that he will give us that: as
politics are likely to develop...

N is true believer; Cons are
demons; [Layer: Cons will not quit
under any circumstances; KK-
the way...]
[He would rather live with
support of right-wing 40% than
left-wing 60%; he wouldn't
give up the 10% "hard-hats"
for 20% college kids +.]

Now, DRV has probably chosen
10-15 year policy.

Make clear to people
that what we offer to
kill, June '70
If we get out?

2.5 of com domination
in 1-2 years.
.95 in 5 years.

(Reagan/Wallace/Abras
pressure.

Agnew: "I came to throw
my hat on a piece of red meat
once in a while."

[If VC bomb all the brotherly]

~~Exaggerate~~

(Status)

(KK: We assume, since we
could annihilate NVN, that they
live only by our good graces,
and should be grateful, (and
must back down)

[When we decide to use nucs,
it will be with the feeling, "Now we're
going to the whorehouse — all of us."]

No chance of resistance to
Hitler: by 34-35, Hitler
had the most popular
regime in the history of
mankind.

[Mogher: attack now war.

"If you are not willing to
use now war, you will
face defeat — after now
escalation.

Germany: exhausted by defeat in WWI.

Tradition: obey the leader.

But one thing is common with U.S.:

lack of intensity to "protect"
(except for youth).

Enemy options in Indochina beyond 1970: Implications for bringing the fighting to an end. May 1970 Staff

If US troops give up offensive combat, American fatalities likely to fall off markedly (say to 25 a week); though NVA can launch periodic surge attacks.

Reversals in pacification ~~xxx~~ could occur, particularly in I Corps; such reversals need not jeopardize VNZ provided the American (and SVNese) public are prepared to expect them.

...If Hanoi concludes that it cannot stem the success of VNZ, it may shift more of its resources to a Laos-and-Cambodia-first strategy...

...As long as Hanoi still has options for continued warfare both in SVN and in Laos/Cambodia, it is unlikely to desist from fighting on. When and if VNZ is successfully completed, it may require threats--internal or external--to the survival of Communist rule in NVN to induce Hanoi to shift from open warfare to a low-level, political struggle.

(In Feb 70, between 70 and 90% of US fatalities were attributable to US strategic actions with a clearly offensive intent: population control and search-and-destroy missions. Once the US no longer emphasizes these objectives,...if the enemy tries to create US casualties by attacking, the difficulties confronting him will be great.

Pressure upon enemy may slacken considerably...the enemy's casualties may decrease relatively more sharply than ours (the enemy suffers most of his known fatalities in small clashes in which no Americans are killed).

(Two options: 1964-65 strategy against

GVN domestic policy currently appears to be oriented toward the rural masses while being authoritarian toward the urban elites. The urban masses...represent almost 40% of the total population...they can be seriously hurt by inflation and as the US forces leave the country, even by unemployment.

RVNAF now has 60,000 officers and 150,000 NCOs

Hanoi's assessment of their prospects in this war ~~have~~ was never based on military capabilities, which they have readily acknowledge to be vastly greater on the American side. They have proceeded on two assumptions: that the American public would tire of the war, and that the GVN could never become a popular or effective government in the South.

The Lao Dong is not likely to place high hopes upon winning by ballot alone, even if the Coms are permitted to play a true political role. Nor is it likely to envisage an alternative to either Comm or GVN (and with it, American) control. of SVN.....accomodation--even if possible locally--would be highly unstable on an agreed nationwide basis and nearly impossible to negotiate.

What conditions might induce Hanoi's leadership to desist...? If Comm discipline wih hin VMN decayed to such an extent Party's control was jeopardized; power strnggle within Lao Dong, or between Party and Army...if morale of armed forces declined serio sly...unlikely. (not if only one of Chinese or Soviet aid ceased;)

North probably could not fight on indefinitely under continuous massive bombing (despite the fact that our bombing until 1968 did not even come close to coercing Hanoi to make peace). However, everything we have learned about the NVNese and their conduct of the war tells us that unless the bombing were of such duration and intensity that it jeopardised the party's control over the population, it is unlikely that the L.D. would desist.

In the process of VNZ, possible setbacks: reversal in pac; NVA attacks on ARVN; temporarily successful attack against a major city. Prob. pressures for withdrawal, just when militarily slowdown in withdrawal would be indicated.

If VNZ completed: can SVN stand continued mobilization; will Congress go on providing aid; still attacks on ARVN, terrorism; maybe urban unrest, repression.

To remove remaining US troops would be to remove deterrent against major escalation; yet if Hanoi launched larged attacks, US might have to choose between deeper reinvovement or withdrawing in face of infiltration or invasion.

A residual US force will constitute a deterrent only if the enemy perceives it as a tripwire. If Hanoi thinks forces will be withdrawn in event of large-scale fighting, our residual forces would be withdrawn, these forces may attract rather than deter attack. (In Germany and Korea, US treaty commitment to major intervention in even those countries are invaded. USG may not be in a position to make a similar pledge to SVN).


((I.e., without treaty commitment, may be dangerous to leave US troops there as--in Pres. eyes--a tripwire. ((This assumes Congress doesn't want a commitment to a tripwire function, or doesn't want to commit itself)).

Description

Advocates

Wash U speech

Recent War



Open-ended war (not of endless)

- Widening war in Laos
- Blasting NVN — US forces in NVN
- Forecast of Ashi style in doing so (+ Nixon style in crisis)
- increases chances of détente with both Russia + China
(demonstrates US remains aggressive power with inimitable abilities)

Business — elections

all college — strike

NV/Nese move back into sanctuaries

NV/Nese commit themselves to long-term insurgency in Cambodia

increase chances of taking Phnom Penh, Laos
(bigger + more successful we are...)

⇒ fits revision to protracted war strategy



Remnant // My

"Only honorable way to end America's painful
role was to oppose it."

[We have desecrated honor through ^{muddy} swamps
^{islands} of betrayal and ~~bloody~~ butchery until we
stink of dishonor.

Polluting the rivers of Indochina with the corpses
of ~~our~~ ~~unborn~~ ~~children~~ women & children - VN ~~again~~ ...
The way out of quicksand....

"US Presidents have been clearing a path of the
mud through the quicksands of Indochina...."

"bloodstained rainbow."

VN2 was presented as a different way to
win the war — or cut losses, withdraw:

lower cost, low key, long haul

[What Nixon has now seen is that it is not
a winning — or is too slow — unless supplemented with Whet tactics.

Must stand out & win every.

Like : — invasion of Holland, WWI
(Schliff Plan)

— "Search-and-destroy"

[Op. vs. COSVN in ... ?
Jag Risk

"Total Victory 43"

Swans of gunships — killed 10 Cambodian troops,
3 days before Pres. speech.
Kill for Peace.

[If enemy (re-)acts against our actions —
Phnom, Laos, etc. — "we will "respond.""

Comp — pressure on saves — Red response —
we "respond."

We attack for in "saves" before he attacks;
we "respond" to AA in NVN before it
fires, and before any plane are shot down.

[What if enemy responds to our attack?
in Cambodia, Laos?

It ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~possible~~ ^{possible} to believe that
the action of the US Army + Air Force + Navy
would bring us honor in this situation.


[Has Nixon decided to ^{win or} lose on this issue
the way Wilson lost on League — go down
fighting in a good cause?]

Note: SFRC brief for audience: as in 1919.

"Senate will have to take its medicine"

20 April
Nixon had word of retal if enemy
moved to endanger our remaining forces
after reduction. Has he decided determine
is inadequate? Or was this always
necessary?

SEATO: — request of countries involved
— "constitutional processes."

Wanted: silence of Pres. supporters
speeches of critics
— censure of Pres ()
— repeal of Taft-Hartley
Repeal Pres/Congress role
State legislatures: Mass...
Hearings on escalation
War crimes proceedings
Fidelity - bold...
Strikes on all congress
~~Businessmen~~

Shores: Should the Pres be impeached?

Are the NSC war criminals

[DE boot: a defense against charges
of war crimes.

— Resignations — explain why

(Commit by Hirsch)

Butler;
Davis; Moore; Cook;

(Kaid; Richardson; Rogers; Helms;

Sullivan

explain the counter-reasons

[What should students do, on strike?

What should business do?

— Tax Refusal

— Consultants withdraw

[Get list]

(No want for DOD)

— Letters from IDA, etc. ; ~~from~~ from

(Kathy?)

— Conference: of Asian scholars

(Challenge expertise of insiders)

— (Counterpart of McNamara: don't accept favors,
lunch, from & reporters).

— Commentary on news reporting; TV;

(interviews...)

[What does Gov say now?

- Attack on secrecy:

[See Wash Monthly

Herack, Stem ...

- Bills: no money for Cambodia
Indochina

- Forestall: invasion of Laos (bail to Bermuda)

backing of NVN

invasion of Thailand

repression

new threats

invasion of NVN

Get

- VN new opinion [Thai; Chi

- Build an anti-war org on Peace Camps

- How to press publishes, etc?

- How to prepare for Civil Liberties ~~Union~~ offensive?

- Students & Dean History: through new eyes.

including JFK bullet

(Avoid lies; avoid

Sent Smith

John

deal to Carl
Nixon

AA - ticket

stocks - Ostrow

II/II/II/II/II

DE: Rammal

Thell

Halperin

✓ Britten

Lavis

✓ Moore

Cooke

✓ Barnett, et al

Bagdikian

Wash. Monthly

✓ Baltes - Ridgeway

Clace

Scoville

Samagost

Scotton

Fitzgerald - Chinsky

OX -

Karnick 74680

Britten 451-0036

DIA 77072

O/H 78127

Shoup 521-7365


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
Burke

Edelman

Brown

McFadden
(change address)





"DMZ attack is of unknown Korean rate"

(Thus, our troops were in grave danger :)

(Why do we attack them?

Why don't we?)

[Sikant - lost] - as head of neutralist coalition :]

[What shall we learn about Richard Nixon from this adventure? About ourselves?

"~~Actions~~" "Judge us by our actions, not our words"

If one cares about honor, image, reputation, example, prestige...

(I still do, secondarily; one reason for bitterness, as well as anger)

"call to the darker impulses..."

- Domains are falling, from the side: we are invading.

- What Cambodian territory have SVNers been promised?

Does he know? Agreed

("We're just taking territory (N) VNers have already been occupying.")

(Who will stay in those sanctuaries? ARVN?)

"Blow the town away." Plantation

As in My Kai : "blow her away"

a sea of shit

(as in Dist. 8 : grams, shit

"infingers" ;

(elections ;

TV set ; ~~hoping~~

US "blow it away."

(thunder ?)

They have dragged us through a sea of shit

Not quicksand in which we, + the poor Pres,
sink ;

We are the guinea in which Vietnam
drowns ; our embrace is the tarbaby that withers ;

Kon Rol is about to find out what it means
to accept US "help" — truth of my prediction on
Net :

(elephants, tigers)

W

Was secrecy maintained - from any - by
fooling Congress?

FAIT MALACCOMPLI

Enough of lying! Demand - and send - Truth.

Don't accept it from Schles, or Scowron,
or Goodwin; or Ball ----

Joseph Hirsch, 4 May 1970 Montreal

"Meanwhile, the Pres has put on alert of
immediacy back into American foreign policy.
This move was not expected. It is contrary
to the "Kiss Doctrine." It upsets the general
assumption that Mr. Nixon was engaged in a
general pullback of American power all around
the world. It must have come as a startling surprise
in the Kremlin. It could have some effect on

on Russian calculation about the Middle East.

The Russian appear to be operating in the ME on the assumption that Wash. certainly would not remove its physical presence in that area, and might even remove that presence.

An act of military initiation by American forces where unexpected must force the Russians to change their calculations and find into the the possibility that Richard Nixon who does the bold and unexpected and the bold in Cambodia might also do the unexpected and the bold in the ME.

DE 656

Miller 488

Starr 402

✓ Budgeny (call Solte)

(Davin's boss; at time)

Norstad

(Davin)

(Sharp, Davin)

✓ Clifford

✓ Wamble

Nitze

Gilpatrick

Steve Stein 6922 Hollywood Suite 418

90028

6 May 1100

[To Barnett:

1. Plan should be: not just "all out by end-71" (Chaffin): "It is not enough to be ^{today} (Kiffin, or) out of Cambodia by July '70 — and back in November, after the monsoon — in Washington the States — or into Laos knows where by December — Cambodia is not the issue. All US troops must be out of Indochina by July 1971.

[Negots: change emphasis to what negots should be about: not, "what will we get for an extra 6 months?"

Van Kleeck:

One of the worst disasters that can befall a nation is to become involved in the wrong war

Separation of powers, Const. requirements: nothing more important than to assure that John Mitchell + Nixon can't

Congress should:

- analyze why Taskin Gulf Res. was wrong, mistaken

(That "black check" was written just after Pres. had committed Taskin Gulf)

- Look at J. G. "uprisal" itself! Even if ~~Pres~~ Pres hadn't lived!

- [Haskell: in '70, there was no black check; then, const. crisis.

A generation of Presidents has led
us down that Trail in Vietnam.

We have followed, unquestioning, till very late.

We have ~~just~~ ^{closed} ~~been~~ ^{losing} honor though...

that is what those have done who ~~were~~
were silent; cheered on...

the will to be kind to...

ignorance that excuses; that shifts responsibility

but that doesn't work, over 20 and 30 years...


(this is not the first S-D mission in Wm. J. C.

then Bruto — mission (colonial); Com
Pentagon.

We have debauched our Presidents by our
complacency & passivity, our magnanimity & ignorance,
just as they have debauched the VNese.

"No more comfort than you shall..."

"We have not succeeded — and we have not
died, there, yet — but we have lost our
health."



17 March NPT

Whoy-Whoy Nixon

Out of Cambodia — by which route?

To where?

intent to not to get bogged down!

(Intent of others to get bogged down?)

What of enemy reaction?

Kind of system?

Lack of success?

We have changed scale of troops — but
ops? Biggest S+O ever!
§.

We have changed the rationale, the stated
objectives, of moving deeper into Indochina,
stepping up scale of ops, adding new targets —
it is to aid & protect the process of
moving out. This has some logic; but it
is the logic of Rostow + Johnson + Rusk + Westy —
rejected not because it could not work but
because it would not work, and it meant an

innocent disproportion of means to ends, and
it was not acceptable to get trying.



Dmit Valeriani

NBC News

Roland Evers


Peter Kicagon

Chicago Daily News

Golden Taler

~~USA~~ Va + 23d

Columbia Circle



See of ^{larger} ~~Pipe~~ — incursion.

Quindash. Tarbaleg. Guayma. Bog.

Locust war.

Addiction.

Basin of addition, calculation:

Old Maid; red flag over Saigon.

Boiling: as Annam is along fire.

On beach with ... Lon Nol.

Shawl. Softening - up.

Emperor has taken off his clothes (I think ... now Nixon)

despite his evident fear of what we would see.

Then Bent case

Debarred on Pres
Will to be tried to.

Humboldt; defect

"No more conquest..."

Why Are We in Vietnam?

Myths of vision:

fast islands

New Frontier:

naïveté

£ FO - the last.

Rach Kim; My Lai; Canton still beyond the
→ Cambodia.

Outlaw Now; out of control; beyond
all laws

(Trice: "decided to forgo the legality
of asking Sen. Rob...")

no member of Congress (after
prison)

Options

Approach.

digitizing
How to do it.

Exaggerates freedom, flex.


Beane: You will lose your mp...

^{concerning}
America, has not died there, yet;
it has lost its health; what happens
next depends on our will to make it live.

Jim

"forgot about the map" —

like note through Holland in NW I.



Sea of Pigs.

Quicksand ;

Lowest wave

Images : verbal : I saw. "Blow it away."

Pictures, TV : reporters, self-congratulatory.
wounded child.

[Cartoons : bugs, quicksand, tattoos. ---

All self-putting (confirming Nixon's fears)

But what of Cambodia ?

Existential choice : uncertain, high stakes,
self-defining and determining.

[why US — to do jobs we are doing?
why even "advisers"?]

Now though closes;

When I was asked: at RAND ~~was this true~~ ~~known~~

Nixon on the way out — & suspicious, effusive,

but no proof — no prospect of realizing

Politics

Quote Pres speech.

- Concern for form, facade, US opinion.

"

- "Not ready for democracy, elections" : Dim, US
(in '50s; then, "war")

- "They don't want Com to win" = they want
war to continue = they will fight/ribe for GVN.

-

Call Thai

VNZ

12 months, 150,000: ability to delay withdrawals

284,000 left next spring

want "political solution that reflects the will
of the SVNese people."

Cambodia

- Sihanouk on Red side
- sanctions for 5 years
- Red action to counter pressure on sanctions; return Sihanouk
- Did VNZ always "require" moves against sanctions [or is this just a "reason" - no need for it to be compelling?]

Were they planned? Or, not seen as necessary? Or, though necessary, blocked by Sihanouk?

[Nixon claim: they were becoming necessary. Still; foreseen, or not?]

- Does reduction of troops justify/require greater risks/costs now, to safeguard their staying?
(Other solutions, then: leave more troops; or take the out)
- Does "success" of VNZ require this? Then, redefine "success" or change policy.

-What "could" NVN do to threaten ARVN/US later
they couldn't do before?

What difference is it to be "completely" outflanked?

Why haven't they already?

Khmer

What action would Nixon's rationale not justify?

Bombing Hanoi? The true "heart of the trouble"

(not COSVN)

Keep casualties "at an absolute minimum"?!

- massacres

- Cambodian neutrality

"end war [win] rather than have it drag
on interminably." "winning the just peace"

[The Pres has admitted, now, what are the
true requirements for "success" of the VN2 program,
and safety of our troops.

"
humiliate |||

defeat |||

anarchy

pitiful helpless giant. Plausible diplomatic protests.

will, character, being tested

promised: to end the war

to win a just peace

lead force of freedom

peace of humiliation "

[Nixon now reveals VNZ policy as a gamble
that Congress would do what they have done.
[The price of "win"]]

What is left of "Nixon Doctrine"?

see: McNamara, Why are we in VN?

Rusk: June 65

Ball: June 65

Did Cambodians ask for this?

Were they consulted?

What evidence of "buildup" in sanctuaries?

When was decision made?

What descriptive statements?

Any consultation with allies? GVN

UK

Why urgency, secrecy?

Third Nations...

We didn't slip into this one.

No "secret war" first.

US role in coup? Foreknowledge?

(Was Nixon preempting Congress. resolutions? !)

Shurdon 2 May 70

(after Carhadia)

Congress disturbed

(1) Loss of credibility, faith in
President's judgment.

(2) Public: frustration at lack of control
of War; "the public wants out, and has
made that clear." (?)

(3) Faith gone that Pres is withdrawing;
[that he is safeguarding other interests only by
prudent, cautious, moves: e.g. prolonging rate of
withdrawal]. Instead: Johnsonian gambles: "shorten
the war by enlarging it, by winning it."

— prepared in secrecy. (Pentagon / WH were
putting out "only advisors" after orders had been
given for invasion.

"Military secrecy for operation" — as in Tanki Half —
used to avoid discussion of a new policy, till we are
committed.

to J. R. L. Com

(Didn't Rogers promise, no troops without
consultation?)

Outlaw Government

4

Santai, 10 July 70

Cambodia is now in the same situation as in Laos;
and we have taken on some commitment,
to removal of non-Comm remnants.

We should dissociate ourselves from commitment to
Lon Nol; discourage involvement of our "backups."
Prefer C.N. To (a) leave, or
(b) reject, surrender power.

Outcome: acceptance of Comm-dominated coalition
(Sihanouk might not come back; C.N. might
have some small role in that case. Prefer:
Sihanouk to come back.

In Laos: stop bombing.

PL-dominated state; Souvanna phoua prob. has role.

NVN-run states: Don't "condone, accept" aggression
and...

We can do very little to prevent this,
without indefinite commitment, pressure to support
weak gov...
Why do this?

THERE ARE TWO DOMINOES (esp. after April 70); L & C.

"Nixon may have concluded from Cambodia
he is free to bomb NVN: say it is to save
US lives, and is limited in time & air power

(perhaps)

Hunter:

NVN, given bombing, doesn't really have
incentive.

New route of infiltration through southern Laos
& NE Cambodia, Sekong River, into Central
Highlands (seized Attapeu & Saravane) (control
tri-border area) (attacked southern);

poss. of buildup, thrust into II Corps (strongest
in I Corps).

Probable 'provocation' for bombing of NVN:

I Corps

Why ~~not~~ not 'mild' bombing, given ~~poss.~~
effect of debate in US; this may be
is that Nixon will draw down forces carefully
while

Yet, Hunter thinks chance of big bombing is very small.

